We study interdependent value settings and extend several results from the well-studied independent private values model to these settings. For revenue-optimal mechanism design, we give conditions under which Myerson's virtual value-based mechanism remains optimal with interdependent values. One of these conditions is robustness of the truthfulness and individual rationality guarantees, in the sense that they are required to hold ex-post. We then consider an even more robust class of mechanisms called "prior independent" ("detail free"), and show that, by simply using one of the bidders to set a reserve price, it is possible to extract near-optimal revenue in an interdependent values setting. This shows that a considerable level of robustness is achievable for interdependent values in single-parameter environments. 
INTRODUCTION
The subject of this article is optimal and robust mechanism design in the classic model of interdependent values introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982] . The model of interdependent values is not only of economic importance in itself, but also sheds new light on the inherent trade-off between revenue maximization and robustness in the design of mechanisms. In technical terms, we study optimal and approximately optimal mechanisms in single-parameter settings, with robust guarantees of ex-post incentive compatibility and individual rationality; the approximately optimal mechanisms that we design are also prior independent, that is, robust to distributional details.
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Our Results
This article makes the following contributions. To describe them and for the remainder of the article, we use the terminology in Table I. (1) While Myerson's theory does not hold in general for interdependent values (there are settings in which the Crémer-McLean mechanism extracts higher revenue than the Myerson mechanism), we show that it is partially recovered when we impose ex-post rather than Bayesian IC and IR constraints, as well as additional assumptions. We apply standard techniques to characterize ex-post IC and IR mechanisms in the interdependent model and to show that their expected revenue equals their expected "conditional virtual surplus." This synthesizes known results in the economic literature (see related work in Section 4). We use the characterization to identify sufficient conditions under which the simple, "ironless" form of the Myerson mechanism is optimal. Under these conditions, the optimal mechanism simply allocates to the bidders with the highest nonnegative (conditional) virtual values.
(2) For nonprivate value settings, we analyze a prior-independent auction and show that it is simultaneously near optimal across a range of possible prior distributions. In particular, we adapt the single-sample approach of Dhangwatnotai et al. [2015] to interdependent values, showing that, with an additional sufficient and necessary MHR assumption, this approach results in an approximately optimal, prior-independent mechanism.
Our prior-independence result demonstrates that nontrivial research questions can arise even in the simplest interdependent settings. Our Myerson-like characterization suggests that many interesting mechanism design results should be possible, even when bidders have interdependent values.
1.3.1. Comparison to Related Work. One motivation for this work is the result of Papadimitriou and Pierrakos [2015] , establishing that optimal and deterministic revenue maximization for correlated values is unlikely, in contrast to the positive results available for independent private values. This raises the question of establishing concrete conditions under which a deterministic feasible optimal mechanism-preferably Myerson-like-is possible beyond independent private values, preferably for general interdependent values. In this article, we follow the now-standard derivation of Myerson's theory (e.g., as appears in Hartline [2014] ), adding the assumptions that we need to make the derivation go through for interdependent values. Much of the results that we show along the way are already known in the economic literature, in which the most comprehensive accounts, to our knowledge, appear in Segal [2003] for correlated private values and in Vohra [2011] for fully interdependent values (see also Section 4 for a detailed literature survey).
Our added contributions to these existing results are, first, concreteness: Vohra [2011] explains that the regularity condition assumed by him is quite opaque, and that it is important to get a better understanding of it. Based on Lopomo [2000] and Li [2013] , we show two sets of reasonable and economically meaningful sufficient conditions, as well as examples of settings that satisfy these conditions. Second, we generalize the theory that appears in Vohra [2011] to multiple items and matroid settings. A third advantage of closely following the Myerson derivation is as follows. In the noninterdependent case, there is a generalization of the Myerson mechanism based on a method called ironing, which maximizes expected revenue without regularity [Myerson 1981 ]. Our work explains why this method will not work for interdependent values without regularity (See Section 5.5).
The most relevant related work to the second part of this article on designing priorindependent mechanisms is Dhangwatnotai et al. [2015] . Our goal here is, as in the first part, to show that there are reasonable assumptions under which a mechanism developed there for independent private values maintains similar guarantees for interdependent value settings. The original analysis of the mechanism breaks down; thus, we are required to develop a different analysis.
To summarize, we view the described work in the first part of the article as the other extreme of Papadimitriou and Pierrakos [2015] , that is, establishing reasonable assumptions that allow a positive result-the extension of Myerson's theory of optimal mechanisms. The second part of the article begins to fill in the range between the two extremes, by trading off assumptions with full optimality. Another recent example of such a trade-off (with dependence on priors) can be found in Chawla et al. [2014] , and we anticipate further future work in this direction.
Organization
In Sections 2 and 3, we present the model and the basic ex-post solution concept. In Section 4, we survey related work. Section 5 develops the first result and the second result appears in Section 6. The study of interdependent settings raises many further research directions, several of which appear in Section 7.
MODEL

Interdependent-Values Model
Single-Parameter Environments. We consider single-parameter Bayesian auction environments (E, I), where E = {1, . . . , n} is a set of bidders and I ⊆ 2 E is a nonempty collection of feasible bidder subsets, that is, subsets of bidders who can win the auction simultaneously. (E, I) is a downward-closed set system, in which a subset of a feasible subset is also feasible. A canonical example of a single-parameter environment is a multiunit auction with unit-demand bidders, in which I includes all sets for which the number of bidders is at most the number of units. Our results are generally of interest even for single-item auctions.
Signals and Interdependent Values. The bidders have possibly correlated, privately known signals s 1 , . . . , s n , drawn from a joint distribution F with density f over the support [0, ω i ] n (ω i may be ∞). We adopt the standard assumptions that f is continuous and nowhere zero. Every bidder i has a publicly known valuation function v i whose arguments are the signals, and the bidder's interdependent value for winning is v i ( s) . Interdependent values are also called information externalities among the bidders. When the bidders share the same valuation function, we say that they have a pure common value. We impose the following standard assumptions on the valuation function v i (·): -Nonnegative and normalized (v i ( 0) = 0); -Twice continuously differentiable; -Nondecreasing in all variables, strictly increasing in s i .
Encompassed Value Models. The described interdependent values model is very general; it includes several narrower settings of interest (recall Table I 
Given s −i , we use one of the two following notations for the derivative of v i|s −i (·):
Motivating Examples
We describe two natural and standard examples of nonprivate values. In the first example, bidders' values directly depend on the private preferences of the others. In the second example, bidders' values depend on a hidden stochastic "state of the world," of which others may posses private knowledge. We then give an example of correlated signals.
Example 2.1 (Weighted-sum values). Let β ∈ [0, 1]. Every bidder's value is a sum of the bidder's own signal and a weighted sum of the other signals:
This is a simplified version of Myerson's value with revision effects [Myerson 1981 ]; when β = 1, this results in the wallet game [Klemperer 1998 ]. Weighted-sum values are a plausible value model for a painting sold in auction; a bidder's value for the painting is determined by the bidder's own appreciation of it, combined with the painting's "resale value" based on how much others appreciate it.
Example 2.2 (Conditionally independent values, mineral rights model).
Bidders have a hidden stochastic pure common value v, modeled by a random variable V drawn from a publicly known distribution F V . An important feature of the mineral rights model is that, conditional on the event V = v, bidders' signals are independent. Furthermore, each signal is an unbiased estimator of V (its expectation when V = v equals v). The bidders' effective value-their value for all operational purposes-is the pure common value
The mineral rights model was developed to capture values in auctions for oil drilling leases [Wilson 1969] . Such values are determined by the true amount of existing oil, but uncertainty and information asymmetries regarding this amount creates interdependency.
A concrete setting of interest is the one in which F V is distributed normally with parameters μ V , σ V (assume that μ V is far from 0 and σ V is small), and the signals are s i = v + η i , where η 1 , . . . , η n are i.i.d. samples drawn from the normal distribution with parameters μ η = 0 and some small σ η . In this case, the value is a linear combination of the prior and empirical means, similar to Example 2.1:
Up to normalization, the coefficient of the empirical mean 1 n i s i is the prior variance and the coefficient of the prior mean μ V is the noise variance.
Example 2.3 (Signals drawn from a multivariate normal distribution). The signals in Example 2.1 can be arbitrarily correlated. A concrete example of a joint signal distribution is a symmetric multivariate normal distribution. This distribution is "nice" in the sense that its marginals are normal as well, and if all pairwise covariances are nonnegative, then signals drawn from it satisfy a strong form of correlation, called affiliation. We will make use of these properties later.
Conditional Virtual Values and Regularity
Fix a bidder i and a signal profile
We denote the corresponding distribution by
The conditional revenue curve represents the expected revenue from setting a threshold price v i (s i , s −i ) for bidder i given that the other signals are s −i . 4 We can now define the conditional virtual value of bidder i as
For private values, the conditional virtual value simplifies to a more familiar form:
For independent common values, it simplifies to the form
Regularity and MHR. We say that F i (· | s −i ) is regular if the conditional virtual value ϕ i (· | s −i ) is weakly increasing; we say that it has monotone hazard rate (MHR) if the inverse hazard rate (1
is weakly decreasing, which does not depend on v i (see Li [2013] The Myerson-like mechanisms that we study later will rank bidders according to their conditional virtual values; while in the IPV model regularity is sufficient for such a mechanism to be IC, these three complications suggest that assumptions beyond regularity will be required. For example, regularity of the signal distribution restricts only the conditional marginals, whereas, for a joint distribution, more "global" constraints may be necessary.
Auction Settings of Interest
We present several settings of particular interest that are extensively studied in the literature. These settings arise by imposing natural further assumptions on a general single-parameter auction environment. We will repeatedly refer to them in our results.
2.4.1. Matroid Settings. Matroid settings arise by imposing a "substitutes" structure on the feasible bidder subsets. The nonempty, downward-closed system (E, I) of bidders and feasible subsets is a matroid if the following exchange property holds: for every S, T ∈ I such that |S| > |T |, there is some bidder i ∈ S \ T such that T ∪ {i} ∈ I (e.g., see Oxley [1992] ). The set E (bidders in our context) is called, in general, the ground set of elements; the sets in I are called independent. All other sets are called dependent. A maximal independent set, that is, an independent set that becomes dependent upon adding any new element from E, is called a basis.
There is a close relation between matroids and the greedy algorithm. Consider a matroid whose elements have nonnegative weights. The greedy algorithm can be used to find a maximum-weight basis by starting from the empty set and repeatedly adding a maximum-weight element among the elements whose addition would preserve the independence of the set. Moreover, matroids are precisely the set system for which such a greedy algorithm works for all weights [Edmonds 1971] .
We demonstrate the concept of matroids with two general examples and three matroid auction settings:
(1) Vector spaces from linear algebra. Define a matroid by letting the ground set E be the set of vectors, and letting the independent sets in I be the linearly independent vector subsets. It is not hard to verify that the bases of the matroid coincide with the bases of the vector space. (2) Undirected graphs from graph theory. Define a matroid by letting the ground set E be the set of graph edges, and letting the independent sets in I be all the forests in the graph. It is not hard to verify that the bases of the matroid coincide with the spanning forests of the graph.
Examples of matroid auction settings include digital goods, where I = 2 E , k-unit auctions, where I is all subsets of size at most k, and unit-demand matching markets corresponding to transversal matroids. An example of the latter is a market in which the units for sale are slots for running jobs on a machine, and a subset of bidders is feasible if each bidder's job can be matched to a slot between its arrival time and deadline. For more on matroids in the context of mechanism design, see Bikhchandani et al. [2011] .
2.4.2. Settings with Regularity or MHR. These are settings in which the signal distribution F is regular (resp., MHR), that is, for every bidder i and signal profile s −i , the conditional marginal distribution F i (· | s −i ) is regular (resp., MHR). The multivariate normal distribution in Example 2.3 is MHR, thus also regular. Regularity arises in the IPV setting as a necessary condition for truthfulness of Myerson's mechanism without an additional ironing procedure.
2.4.3. Settings with Affiliation. These are settings that arise by imposing affiliation-a form of positive correlation-on the joint signal distribution F with density f . Affiliation was introduced by Milgrom and Weber [1982] ; since then, it has become a standard assumption in the context of correlated and interdependent values, so much so that it is considered "almost synonymous with dependence in auctions" . It is related to many well-studied mathematical concepts such as association, the FKG inequality, and log-supermodularity [Alon and Spencer 2008] .
Intuitively, signals are affiliated when observing a subset of high signals makes it more likely that the remaining signals are also high. Formally, for every pair of signal profiles s, t
where ( s ∨ t) is the component-wise maximum of s and t, and ( s ∧ t) is the componentwise minimum of s and t. Note that the inequality in Equation (4) holds with equality for independent signals. It also holds for the multivariate normal distribution in Example 2.3, which is affiliated since all pairwise covariances are nonnegative [de Castro and Paarsch 2010 ]. An example showing that affiliation is a stronger condition than positive correlation is the bivariate uniform distribution over support {(1, 2), (2, 1), (3, 3), (4, 4), (5, 5), (6, 6)}; the two variables are positively correlated but not affiliated.
Symmetric Settings. Symmetry involves assumptions on both valuation functions and the signal distribution: (a) for every bidder
where v is common to all bidders and symmetric in its last n − 1 arguments; (b) the joint density f is assumed to be defined on support [0, ω] n and symmetric in all its arguments. In a symmetric setting, bidders thus have the same conditional densities, revenue curves, and virtual value functions. Their values may be different, however, since their own signal plays a distinct role in the valuation function. Notably, Milgrom and Weber [1982] 
Weaker versions of single crossing may require a nonstrict inequality, or that the inequality hold only for i, j, s such that
Stronger versions may require the left-hand side of Equation (5) We assume risk-neutral bidders with quasi-linear utilities, that is, given a mechanism and a signal profile s, bidder i's effective utility is
Solution Concepts
Mechanism design aims to define the rules of a game played by the bidders such that a solution of the game has desirable properties, in particular, good objective function value subject to IC and IR. The solution concept-what constitutes a solution to the game-dictates the possibilities and impossibilities of mechanism design theory [Chung and Ely 2006] . We now describe three major solution concepts corresponding to three different equilibria types of the game.
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Definition 3.1 (Ex post IC and ex-post IR mechanism) . A mechanism is ex-post IC and ex-post IR if, for every bidder i, true signal s i , false reports i , and signal profile s −i ,
(Inequality is the ex-post IC condition and Inequality 7 is the ex-post IR condition.) In other words, participating and truth-telling is an ex-post equilibrium of the corresponding game, that is, it is a Nash equilibrium in the ex-post stage of the game in which private signals are common knowledge.
Definition 3.2 (Dominant strategy IC mechanism).
A mechanism is dominant strategy IC if, for every bidder i, true signal profile s, and reported signal profile r,
that is, truth-telling is a dominant-strategy equilibrium of the corresponding game.
Definition 3.3 (Bayesian IC and interim IR mechanism).
A mechanism is Bayesian IC (incentive compatible) and interim IR (individually rational) if, for every bidder i, true signal s i , and false reports i ,
That is, participating and truth-telling is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the corresponding game in the interim stage, in which each individual knows one's own signal, but not the others.
Discussion of the Ex-Post Solution Concept
These definitions show that ex-post is a weaker solution concept than dominant strategies (for which truthfulness holds for any reported signal profile), and a stronger one than Bayesian/interim (whose guarantees are in expectation over the true signal profile). We now briefly discuss our choice to focus on this intermediate solution concept. For additional discussion, see Segal [2003] , Milgrom [2004] , Bergemann and Morris [2005] , and Ely [2006, 2007] .
3.2.1. Ex-Post versus Bayesian. The solution concept most widely used in mechanism design theory is Bayes-Nash equilibrium [Chung and Ely 2006] . In practice, the common first-price and second-price auctions in interdependent settings are Bayesian and not ex-post. On the flip side, the Crémer-McLean mechanism has been criticized as impractical for, among other issues, lack of the ex-post IR property. This makes the outcome unstable in the sense that bidders may regret their participation in hindsight, and attempt to exercise their de facto "veto" power of walking away from the auction, refusing to collect their winnings and to honor their payments (see Compte and Jehiel [2009] ). The lack of ex-post IR also requires the Crémer-McLean mechanism to rely on bidders' knowledge of the joint distribution, without which they cannot determine whether participating is rational.
Focusing on ex-post mechanisms prevents these issues. Ex-post IC and ex-post IR are "no regret" properties-for any realization of the signals, bidders regret neither participating in the auction nor reporting their signals truthfully, even when all signals become publicly known. This makes the mechanism more robust (thus closer to the computer science worst-case approach). To decide whether to participate and how to report, bidders do not have to know the signal distribution, only the signal support and the valuation functions. This is compatible with Wilson's doctrine of detail-free mechanisms that are robust to detailed knowledge of the distribution [Wilson 1987 ]. Among other advantages, robustness saves transaction costs associated with learning about opponents' distributions, and benefits the seller as well, who may be wary of using a Bayesian mechanism if unsure how well bidders are informed.
We now mention two caveats to the ex-post approach. First, in settings such as the mineral rights model (Example 2.2), one can argue that a bidder's knowledge of one's own valuation function v( s) = E V ∼F V [V | s] depends on one's knowledge of the others' distributions-this is necessary for the bidder to derive v from the publicly known distribution F V . In a model that crucially depends on bidders' knowledge of each other's distributions, and assuming that the seller is aware that bidders are well informed, there is less added robustness in an ex-post solution over a Bayesian one. Note, however, that this issue does not arise in settings such as Example 2.1, and that it arguably indicates that the "type space" is simply not rich enough (see Bergemann and Morris [2005] ). A second and related caveat is that it is debatable whether ex-post is necessary for robustness; this question and, more generally, the theoretical foundation of robustness in mechanism design is discussed in Segal [2003] , Bergemann and Morris [2005] and Ely [2006, 2007] and references within.
Ex-Post versus Dominant Strategies.
For private values (whether correlated or independent), dominant strategy IC and ex-post IC coincide. For nonprivate values, however, the concept of dominant strategy IC guarantees an even stronger no-regret property than the concept of ex-post IC, since it does not depend on the other bidders reporting truthfully. For example, in the weighted-sum values case (Example 2.1), if bidder j underreports the signal s j , and bidder i somehow knows j's true signal, in an ex-post mechanism, i may potentially benefit by overreporting signal s i , so that i's true value is reflected by the mechanism.
The following example demonstrates that the dominant strategy IC requirement may be too strong for a deterministic mechanism to extract nontrivial revenue. The example involves (by necessity) nonprivate values, and shows that there are cases in which there is an ex-post IC and IR mechanism with positive revenue, whereas every dominant strategy IC mechanism has zero revenue.
Example 3.4. Two bidders compete for a single item. Their values are v 1 = s 1 s 2 and v 2 = 0, where s 1 , s 2 ∈ {0, 1}. If one of the reported signals is 0, by ex-post IR, the mechanism gets zero revenue. For reported signal profile r = (1, 1), to achieve nonzero revenue, the mechanism extracts from bidder 1 a payment bounded away from 0. However, if the true signal profile is s = (1, 0) but bidder 2 reports r 2 = 1, then bidder 1 is better off reporting r 1 = 0 untruthfully, in contradiction to dominant strategy IC.
The English Auction
The English auction is an ascending price auction that operates in "value space": bidders act upon their postulated values rather than report their signals to the mechanism. Specifically, in order to determine when to irrevocably drop out of the ascending auction, bidders must constantly update their conjectured value based on their observations up to the current point in the auction. All other mechanisms that we consider are direct revelation mechanisms that work in "signal space"; the English auction provides an indirect implementation for them [Lopomo 2000; Chung and Ely 2007] .
The most relevant version of the English auction for our purpose is the so-called Japanese version. In this version, the auctioneer gradually raises the price of the item for sale; once a bidder finds the price too high, the bidder indicates (e.g., by lowering the hand) no longer participating in the auction. The winner pays the price at which the second-to-last bidder dropped out (for details see, e.g., Krishna [2010] ).
The crucial aspect of the English action is that it is open -the prices at which bidders drop out are observed by all. The English auction has a unique outcome in symmetric Bayesian equilibrium, which, thanks to the openness of the auction, has the remarkable property of ensuring no ex-post regret [Milgrom and Weber 1982; Bikhchandani et al. 2002] .
RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss related work on revenue guarantees of auctions in singleparameter settings. Section 5 of this article can be seen as unifying and generalizing many previous results dispersed across the mechanism design literature. We now survey these results as well as present previous work on computational aspects. Note that this section is not a prerequisite to Section 5, which is self-contained.
In describing previous results, and in Section 5 itself, we use the following terminology. We refer to results similar to Proposition 5.1 as characterization results; these state necessary and sufficient conditions on the allocation and/or payment rules such that the resulting mechanism is IC and IR with respect to the desired solution concept. By virtual surplus results, we mean results similar to Proposition 5.2, showing that revenue equals virtual surplus in expectation for an appropriate definition of virtual values. Optimal mechanism results state conditions under which the optimal mechanism can be derived from the virtual surplus results. Myerson [1981] lays the foundations of optimal mechanism design: Myerson considers Bayesian IC and interim IR mechanisms in the IPV model, and establishes characterization, virtual surplus, and optimal mechanism results. The optimal mechanism turns out to be deterministic, dominant strategy IC, and ex-post IR, while achieving optimality among all randomized, Bayesian IC, and interim IR counterparts. A regularity condition simplifies the Myerson mechanism, but is not required.
Independent Values, Bayesian Solution
Myerson's characterization and virtual surplus (but not optimal mechanism) 7 results apply to nonprivate (independent) values as well, for an appropriately modified definition of virtual values [Bulow and Klemperer 1996; Klemperer 1999] . Additional work on optimal auctions in settings with nonprivate values includes Branco [1996] andÜlkü [2013] .
Interdependent Values, Bayesian Solution
Myerson's theory does not directly apply when there is correlation among the bidders. The complicating issue is that, in the presence of correlation, the allocation and payment rules for a bidder may depend not only on the bidder's reported signal, but also on the bidder's true signal through correlation with other bidders' signals. Cremér and McLean [1985, 1988] design an ex-post IC but interim IR auction, which extracts full welfare in expectation under a mild "full rank" condition on the correlation; their mechanism is a generalized VCG auction, augmented with carefully designed lotteries. McAfee and Reny [1992] extend this result from discrete to continuous signals (see also Rahman [2014] ).
In a classic paper, building upon early work by Wilson [1969] and Milgrom and Weber [1982] lay out a general model of interdependent values, and develop the linkage principle in place of the revenue equivalence principle. They apply the linkage principle to rank the common auction formats (first-price, second-price, English and Dutch auctions) according to their expected revenue, when signals are affiliated and bids form a symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium (actually an ex-post equilibrium for the English auction).
Interdependent Values, Ex-Post Solution
The ex-post solution concept has generated much interest in the last decade; we now survey several papers most related to our work.
Correlated Values. Section 5 is closely related to the work of Segal [2003] (see also Chung and Ely [2007] ). Segal [2003] studies ex-post IC and ex-post IR mechanisms for selling multiple units of an item in the correlated values model. He gives a characterization and virtual surplus result based on conditional virtual values, as defined in Equation (2). Segal [2003] also derives an optimal mechanism result under regularity and the assumption that conditional virtual values are single crossing; he notes that, for affiliated signals, the latter assumption holds. Our results in Section 5 can be seen as a generalization of Segal's results beyond multiunit settings and beyond private values.
Interdependent Values. A characterization result for ex-post IC and ex-post IR mechanisms in the interdependent values model is found in Chung and Ely [2006] (see also Lopomo [2000] and Vohra [2011] ). Chung and Ely's result is via an interesting connection among the following characterizations: ex-post IC and ex-post IR mechanisms for interdependent values, Bayesian IC and interim IR mechanisms for independent values, ex-post IC (equivalently, dominant strategy IC) and ex-post IR mechanisms for private values, and IC and IR mechanisms for a single bidder (for which all solution concepts converge).
For a single item, Vohra [2011] states virtual surplus and optimal mechanism results; the former is with respect to conditional virtual values as defined in Equation (1), and the latter is under the assumption that conditional virtual values are single-crossing. Vohra [2011] notes that, for this result to be useful, one must identify restrictions on the distribution and valuation functions that would lead to single crossing. Such restrictions appear in Section 5. For further comparison to this article, see Section 1.3.1. Recently and concurrently to our work, Csapó and Müller [2013] and Li [2013] also develop virtual surplus results for interdependent values. Csapó and Müller apply these in the context of supplying a single public good and assuming discrete signals. A more detailed description of the work of Li appears in Section 4.6.
Beyond Single-Parameter. Jehiel et al. [2006] show impossibility results for ex-post implementation in multi-parameter settings. In particular, in a public decision setting with generic valuations, the only deterministic social choice functions that are ex-post implementable are trivial (i.e., constant).
English Auction with Interdependent Values
The importance of the English auction in the context of non-IPV settings has long been recognized. For nonprivate values, Bulow and Klemperer study symmetric bidders under a strong regularity condition, and show that the English auction's expected revenue (with or without reserve) equals the expected conditional virtual surplus as defined in Equation (1) [Bulow and Klemperer 1996 , Lemmas 1 and 2]. They establish that the English auction with optimally chosen reserve is optimal among all Bayesian IC and interim IR mechanisms [Bulow and Klemperer 1996, Theorem 2] . McAfee and Reny [1992] show that, while the English auction with reserve is optimal in a symmetric independent setting, minor perturbations of the distribution can introduce correlation and destroy optimality in comparison to other Bayesian mechanisms. They conjecture that the English auction's prevalence in practice has to do with the need to perform well in a variety of circumstances, and call for formalizing a notion of robustness.
The ex-post solution concept adopted in this article is precisely such a robustness notion. The following two results are close to our work; we re-derive them as corollaries in our framework (see Corollaries 5.13 and 5.14). For correlated values and under regularity and affiliation assumptions, Chung and Ely [2007] show that the English auction with optimally chosen reserve is optimal among all ex-post IC and ex-post IR mechanisms. For interdependent values in the Milgrom and Weber setting, Lopomo [2000] identifies conditions under which the English auction with optimally chosen reserve is optimal among all mechanisms in a class that he calls "no-regret" (see Definition 5.9).
For completeness, we describe in more detail the result of Lopomo [2000] . He studies mechanisms with a "no-regret" equilibrium in the sense that each bidder has no incentive to revise one's decisions after observing opponents' behavior; ex-post direct revelation mechanisms are a subclass in which no regret holds after observing all signals. Lopomo [2000] shows that payments in a no-regret equilibrium must be determined by the allocation rule and by the bidders' willingness to pay given all information revealed by the others' actions. He then shows that, for a fixed allocation rule and assuming affiliation, the expected revenue is maximized by revealing all information to the winning bidder. The next step is to express the expected revenue as conditional virtual surplus, from which the optimal allocation rule can be derived under additional assumptions. Lopomo [2000] then shows that, in the Milgrom-Weber model, the English auction with reserve implements the optimal allocation rule. He also demonstrates that the English auction is not optimal among the wider class of interim IR mechanisms with a "losers do not pay" restriction.
Computational Considerations, Randomized and Near-Optimal Mechanisms
Oracle versus Explicit Model. An alternative approach to characterizing ex-post IC and ex-post IR in order to find the optimal mechanism is designing a computationally tractable algorithm that computes or approximates such a mechanism. This requires addressing the question of how to represent the joint signal distribution. In the oracle model, the distribution is available to the mechanism/algorithm as a black box, which can be queried with respect to conditional probabilities. Upon receiving a signal profile as input, the mechanism/algorithm submits queries and returns an allocation rule and payments. In the explicit model, the distribution is explicitly provided as input, upon which the algorithm outputs the mechanism's allocation and payment rules.
Note that a hardness result in the explicit model implies hardness in the oracle model, whereas a positive algorithmic result in the oracle model implies such a result in the explicit model.
Computational Hardness. Papadimitriou and Pierrakos [2015] prove computational hardness in the explicit model-even for correlated values, finding the optimal deterministic, ex-post IC and ex-post IR mechanism when there are at least three bidders is NP-hard. When there are exactly two bidders, the optimal deterministic mechanism can be computed in polynomial time and is optimal among all randomized mechanisms as well [Dobzinski et al. 2011; Papadimitriou and Pierrakos 2015] .
Randomized Mechanisms. Computational hardness does not extend to optimal randomized mechanisms, which can be computed in the explicit model in polynomial time for all single-parameter domains, as well as unit-demand and additive multi-parameter domains [Dobzinski et al. 2011; Papadimitriou and Pierrakos 2015] . With at least three bidders, randomized mechanisms can strictly outperform deterministic mechanisms in terms of expected revenue, albeit by a small constant factor (explained next). This implies that additional assumptions are needed for a Myerson-like deterministic mechanism to be optimal (see Section 5).
Near-Optimal Mechanisms. In the oracle model with correlated values, Ronen [2001] designs the lookahead auction-a simple, deterministic, ex-post IC and ex-post IR mechanism, which guarantees a constant approximation to the optimal expected revenue. Dobzinski et al. [2011] build upon Ronen's work to design, for single-item settings, a deterministic mechanism that achieves a 5/3-approximation, and a randomized one that achieves a (3/2 + )-approximation (for improved bounds, see Chen et al. [2011] ).
Informational Hardness for the English Auction. In the oracle model, Ronen and Saberi [2002] show that a deterministic English auction cannot achieve an approximation ratio better than 3/4 with respect to the optimal expected revenue. Due to the oracle setup, this bound is explicit and does not rely on complexity assumptions.
Applications
Myerson's theory has multiple applications in the IPV model. Examples of applications studied in the algorithmic game theory community include simple near-optimal auctions [Neeman 2003; Hartline and Roughgarden 2009] , prior-independent mechanisms [Segal 2003; Dhangwatnotai et al. 2015] , and prior-free mechanisms [Goldberg et al. 2006] .
In Section 6, we expand upon the theme of robustness by developing priorindependent mechanisms for interdependent values, using techniques from Dhangwatnotai et al. [2015] . Independent from and orthogonal to our work, Li [2013] shows a simple near-optimal auction for settings with interdependent values. She studies the VCG mechanism with monopoly reserves in matroid settings, where values satisfy a single-crossing condition and the valuation distribution satisfies the generalized monotone hazard rate condition. Li shows that, in expectation, VCG with monopoly reserves extracts at least 1/e of the full surplus. 
MYERSON THEORY FOR INTERDEPENDENT VALUES
The fundamental results of single-parameter optimal auction theory-Myerson's optimal mechanism and characterization results leading to it-do not carry over to interdependent settings. These results are at least partially recovered with small adaptations once we impose the ex-post requirements. The intuition behind this is as follows: The original proofs rely on signal independence so that both the probability x i of winning and the expected payment p i depend only on bidder i's reported signal, not on bidder i's true one. By switching from Bayesian IC and interim IR to ex-post IC and ex-post IR, we ensure that the guarantees hold for any signal profile s −i . Since we can now fix s −i , rules x i and p i once again depend only on bidder i's reported signal; thus, the independence assumption is no longer necessary.
We describe the organization of this section using the terminology introduced in Section 4. Section 5.1 states characterization and virtual surplus results, and Sections 5.2 and 5.3 show optimal mechanism results (Section 5.2 addresses correlated values while Section 5.3 deals with full interdependence). For completeness, Section 5.4 discusses indirect implementation by the English auction. Section 5.5 discusses the assumptions of single-crossing and regularity that are used in the optimal mechanism results of Sections 5.2 and 5.3. Some of the proofs are deferred to Appendix A.
Characterization and Expected Revenue of Ex-Post Mechanisms
We begin by developing the theory as far as we can with no assumptions on the setting, that is, we refrain from adding any of the constraints in Section 2.4. It is well known that characterization and equal-revenue results hold. 
The payment identity and inequality imply that the allocation rule for every bidder determines the bidder's payment up to the bidder's expected payoff for a zero signal, and that this expected payoff must be nonnegative. For private values, with a standard assumption of no positive transfers, the payment constraints simplify to the identity 
PROPOSITION 5.2 (REVENUE EQUALS VIRTUAL SURPLUS IN EXPECTATION). For every interdependent values setting, the expected revenue of an ex-post IC and ex-post IR mechanism equals its expected conditional virtual surplus, up to an additive factor:
E s i p i ( s) = E s i x i ( s)ϕ i (s i | s −i ) − i E s −i x i (0, s −i )v i (0, s −i ) − p i (0, s −i ) ACM
Optimal Mechanism for Correlated Private Values
Proposition 5.2 suggests that, to optimize expected revenue, the best course of action is to maximize conditional virtual surplus pointwise. However, the issue is monotonicity: even in the independent private values model, regularity is necessary for pointwise maximization to form a monotone allocation rule, and in more general models, we need more assumptions (see discussion in Section 5.5).
In this section, we focus on correlated values in matroid settings, with assumptions of regularity and affiliation (recall Sections 2.4.1, 2.4.2, and 2.4.3). An example of such a setting, which is symmetric in addition to regular and affiliated, is a single-item setting in which bidders' values are drawn from the multivariate normal distribution in Example 2.3.
In Algorithm 1, we define a Myerson mechanism for interdependent values. The main result in this section is its optimality for correlated values under the assumptions presented earlier.
THEOREM 5.3 (MYERSON MECHANISM IS EX-POST IC, IR, AND OPTIMAL). For every matroid setting with correlated values that satisfies regularity and affiliation, the Myerson mechanism is ex-post IC, ex-post IR, and optimal among all ex-post IC and ex-post IR mechanisms.
The following lemma is key to the analysis of the Myerson mechanism's performance. A similar analysis appears in Segal [2003] .
LEMMA 5.4 (SINGLE CROSSING OF CONDITIONAL VIRTUAL VALUES). For every correlated values setting with regular affiliated distribution, raising signal s i weakly increases bidder i's conditional virtual value and weakly decreases all other conditional virtual values.
PROOF. First, note that, by regularity of the signal distribution, raising signal s i increases bidder i's conditional virtual value ϕ i (s i | s −i ). It is left to prove the following claim: for every two bidders i, j, and every signal profile s −i , bidder j's conditional virtual value is weakly decreasing in bidder i s signal s i . Lets i ≥ s i , and denote bys − j , s − j the signal profiles excluding j with i's signal set tos i , s i , respectively. By definition,s − j ≥ s − j . We show that ϕ j (s j |s − j ) ≤ ϕ j (s j | s − j ), where
in terms of hazard rate [Krishna 2010, Appendix D] , that is,
which is sufficient to complete the proof.
We remark that an even stronger version of single crossing holds if bidders are symmetric.
LEMMA 5.5 (ORDER OF VIRTUAL VALUES MATCHES ORDER OF SIGNALS). For every correlated values setting with symmetric bidders and regular affiliated distribution, for every signal profile s such that s i ≥ s j , the bidder with a higher signal has a higher conditional virtual value
PROOF. Given a signal profile s, where
The following three inequalities follow from regularity, Lemma 5.4 (single-crossing conditional virtual values), and symmetry of the bidders and distributions, respectively. These properties allow us to first replace s i by s j ≤ s i in bidder i's virtual value, then compare bidder i's virtual value given signal s j versus signal s i for bidder j (i.e., replace s −i by s − j ), and finally replace F i , f i by F j , f j , completing the proof:
Next, we establish that the allocation rule of the Myerson mechanism in Algorithm 1 is monotone in matroid settings. For this, we use the following claim regarding matroids.
CLAIM 5.6. Consider an algorithm for finding a maximum-weight basis of a matroid (E, I), which breaks ties consistently according to an ordering π of the elements. Then, an element i with weight w i is chosen by the algorithm if and only if the following condition holds: for every independent set A ∈ I such that, for every element j ∈ A, either (i) w j > w i or (ii) w j = w i and j precedes i in the ordering π , A∪ {i} ∈ I.
PROOF. See Appendix A.
LEMMA 5.7 (MONOTONICITY). For every matroid setting with correlated values that satisfies regularity and affiliation, maximizing conditional virtual surplus while breaking ties arbitrarily but consistently is monotone.
PROOF. By Lemma 5.4, raising signal s i can only increase bidder i's conditional virtual value, and can only lower the conditional virtual values of other bidders (and does not change, of course, the consistent tie-breaking order). The conditional virtual values are the weights of the bidders when viewed as elements of the feasibility matroid. Thus, raising s i has the effect of shrinking the collection of constraints for which, according to Claim 5.6, i belongs to the winning set if and only if every constraint is satisfied. This shows that monotonicity holds, completing the proof.
The following example demonstrates that the condition of a matroid setting in Lemma 5.7 is necessary.
Example 5.8 (Nonmonotonicity beyond matroids). Consider a correlated values setting with three bidders. The signals are drawn from the following regular affiliated distribution: signal profiles (0.9, 1, 1.1), (0.9, 2, 1.1), (1, 1, 1.1), (1, 2, 1.1) appear with probabilities 0.4, 0.1, 0.1, 0.4. The feasible sets of the single-parameter auction environment are bidder sets {1}, {2}, {3}, and {1, 2}. This is a downward closed-set system that is not a matroid, since the exchange property fails to hold (for feasible sets S = {1, 2} and T = {3}, |S| > |T |, yet there is no bidder i ∈ S \ T such that T ∪ {i} is feasible). Now, consider the signal profile (0.9,1,1.1) and assume that the reported signal from bidder 1 raises from 0.9 to 1. The bidders' conditional virtual value profile changes from (0.65, 0.75, 1.1) to (1, −3, 1.1). With the original signal reports, the feasible bidder set maximizing nonnegative conditional virtual surplus was {1, 2}, whereas after bidder 1 raises the report, it becomes {3}, contradicting monotonicity.
The problem arises since, by raising one's own signal, bidder 1 decreases the conditional virtual value of bidder 2, such that neither {1, 2} nor {1} form a feasible set with highest nonnegative conditional virtual surplus. Moreover, the feasible sets are not a matroid; thus, {3} cannot feasibly be added to {1}.
We are now ready to prove the main result regarding optimality of the Myerson mechanism.
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.3. By the characterization of ex-post mechanisms (Proposition 5.1) applied to private values, for every bidder i, it is sufficient to show that the allocation rule x i is monotone in the signal s i , and that the payment identity
Lemma 5.7 establishes monotonicity, and the payment identity holds by the following argument. The Myerson mechanism is deterministic; thus, either x i ( s) = 0 or x i ( s) = 1. In the former case, by monotonicity, x i (t, s −i ) = 0 for every t ≤ s i ; thus, both sides of the identity are equal to zero. In the latter case, since s * i is bidder i's threshold signal, the right-hand side is
and for private values s * i is precisely the payment p i ( s) charged by the Myerson mechanism.
It is left to show optimality. The expected revenue of an ex-post IC and ex-post IR mechanism is its expected virtual surplus (Proposition 5.2), and the Myerson mechanism maximizes virtual surplus for every signal profile.
Optimal Mechanism for Interdependent Values
The results for correlated values generalize to interdependent values; however, this setting is harder and requires further assumptions. Recall that the general conditional virtual value form in Equation (1) includes two extra dependencies on other bidders' signals relative to the form in Equation (2), which applies to correlated values. The extra assumptions are needed to establish monotonicity of the allocation rule in Algorithm 1 despite these dependencies.
We adopt the setting studied by Lopomo [2000] in the context of the English auction; namely, the assumptions that we impose on our auction setting are that bidders are symmetric and have affiliated signals (Sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.4), and that the following conditions on the valuation function and distribution hold. For every signal profile s such that s i ≥ s j , the Lopomo assumptions imply that
An example of a symmetric affiliated setting in which the Lopomo assumptions hold is a single-item setting with weighted-sum values (Example 2.1) and signals drawn from the multivariate normal distribution of Example 2.3. Note that Equation (8) holds whenever values are multilinear. 8 We can now state this section's main result: an analogue of Theorem 5.3 for interdependent values, showing that the Myerson mechanism defined in Algorithm 1 is optimal.
THEOREM 5.10 (MYERSON MECHANISM IS EX-POST IC, IR, AND OPTIMAL). For every matroid setting with interdependent values that satisfies affiliation, symmetry, and the Lopomo assumptions, the Myerson mechanism is ex-post IC, ex-post IR, and optimal among all ex-post IC and ex-post IR mechanisms.
The proof of Theorem 5.10, like the proof of its analogue Theorem 5.3, boils down to showing monotonicity of the Myerson mechanism. We now turn to establishing monotonicity, using that the order of conditional virtual values coincides with the order of signals. This strong form of single crossing for conditional virtual values (see Lemmas 5.4 and 5.5) is stated in the following lemma, which can be viewed as a generalization of the same result in the IPV model for a symmetric setting that satisfies regularity.
LEMMA 5.11 (ORDER OF VIRTUAL VALUES MATCHES ORDER OF SIGNALS). For every symmetric setting with interdependent values that satisfies affiliation and the Lopomo assumptions, for every signal profile s such that s i ≥ s j , the bidder with a higher signal has a higher conditional virtual value
identity and payment inequality hold. Lemma 5.12 establishes monotonicity. The payment inequality p i (0,
, where s * i = 0. As for the payment identity, by determinism and monotonicity of the Myerson mechanism and assuming that x i ( s) = 1,
It is left to show optimality. By Proposition 5.2, the expected revenue of an ex-post IC and ex-post IR mechanism is equal to its expected virtual surplus up to an additive term
. The Myerson mechanism maximizes the virtual surplus for every signal profile, and sets the nonpositive additive term to zero, thus achieving optimality.
Indirect Implementation via English Auction
For completeness, we conclude this section with results by Lopomo [2000] and Chung and Ely [2007] on implementing the optimal mechanism via the English auction with a carefully chosen reserve, when there is a single item for sale and the bidders are symmetric. The relation between the previous sections and these results is the same as the relation between Myerson's original mechanism and the following well-known result in the IPV model: the second-price auction with an optimal reserve maximizes the expected revenue from selling a single item when bidders are symmetric and regularity holds. By replacing the second-price auction with the English auction, and setting the reserve price after all bidders but one have dropped out and revealed their information, we get an indirect implementation of the optimal mechanism that works directly in value space.
COROLLARY 5.13 ([CHUNG AND ELY 2007]). For every symmetric single-item setting with correlated values that satisfies regularity and affiliation, the English auction with optimal reserve price is optimal among all ex-post IC and ex-post IR mechanisms.
PROOF. Consider the symmetric ex-post equilibrium of the English auction, in which assuming that δ bidders have dropped out so that their signals are known, all bidders calculate what their value would be if the n − δ − 1 signals unknown to them were equal to their privately known signal, and drop out if the price reaches this value [Milgrom and Weber 1982] . The last bidder to remain in the auction is the bidder with highest signal, who, by Lemma 5.5, also has the highest conditional virtual value. Set an optimal reserve price for this bidder. Since the reserve is set after signals of all other bidders are revealed, it guarantees that this bidder wins precisely when this bidder's conditional virtual value, given the other signals, is nonnegative. The resulting mechanism thus maximizes conditional virtual surplus for every signal profile, and is equivalent to the optimal Myerson mechanism in Algorithm 1.
The same proof with Lemma 5.5 replaced by Lemma 5.11 shows the following.
COROLLARY 5.14 ([LOPOMO 2000]). For every symmetric single-item setting with interdependent values that satisfies affiliation and the Lopomo assumptions, the
English auction with optimal reserve price is optimal among all ex-post IC and ex-post IR mechanisms. Fig. 1 . Regularity without single crossing. The conditional virtual values of bidders i and j both increase as signal s i increases, crossing each other more than once. Observe that, if i and j are the two bidders with the highest conditional virtual values, the virtual-surplus-maximizing allocation rule is not monotone.
Discussion of Assumptions
The Myerson mechanism in Algorithm 1 is truthful for interdependent values only if its virtual-surplus-maximizing allocation rule is monotone. Even in the IPV model, a regularity assumption is necessary for the Myerson mechanism to be monotone without an additional ironing procedure (we discuss ironing for interdependent values later). In the interdependent values model, an additional single-crossing assumption for conditional virtual values is required. Figure 1 Plugging into Equation (3), the conditional virtual value of bidder i is j s j − (1 − G(s i ))/g(s i ) = s i /2 + j =i s j . Thus, when bidder i's signal increases by s i , bidder i's own conditional virtual value increases by s i /2 while bidder i's competitors' conditional virtual values increase by the full difference s i . Single crossing is thus violated and the Myerson mechanism will not be truthful.
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Single crossing as an assumption in itself is quite opaque; earlier, we have identified economically meaningful conditions on the auction environment that are sufficient for single crossing to hold, both in the special case of correlated values and in the more general case of interdependent values. While the standard assumption of affiliation is sufficient in the correlated values setting, this is no longer the case for full interdependence. However, as we have seen, symmetry together with the Lopomo assumptions are sufficient (and alternative sufficient conditions exist as well). While the known computational hardness results imply that some of these assumptions (or alternative ones) are required for optimality of the deterministic Myerson mechanism, achieving a precise understanding of what is necessary remains an open question.
Ironing. Does the method of ironing developed by Myerson [1981] work for interdependent values?
11 Technically, the ironing method can easily be applied to conditional 10 In fact, in this example, the order of conditional virtual values is exactly the order of signals reversed; we can show that the optimal allocation rule, in this case, is to pick a random winner-any other "more sensible" allocation rule will violate monotonicity. 11 A description of the ironing method is beyond the scope of this article; for an introduction, see Hartline [2014] .
virtual values, that is, the Myerson mechanism with ironing is well defined for interdependent values. Furthermore, it still holds that ironed conditional virtual surplus gives an upper bound on conditional virtual surplus, which is tight for mechanisms that "respect" the ironed intervals (in the sense that the allocation does not change along such an interval). The crucial difference from the IPV model is that the expected revenue of the Myerson mechanism with ironing can be strictly lower than the expected ironed conditional virtual surplus. Thus, even though the Myerson mechanism with ironing truthfully maximizes the latter, it is no longer guaranteed to achieve the maximum expected revenue. This gap arises due to the fact that the Myerson mechanism with ironing does not respect ironed intervals. Indeed, while the increase in a bidder's signal does not change the bidder's ironed conditional virtual value within an ironed segment, it may change others' ironed conditional virtual values, thus modifying the allocation.
Since the Myerson mechanism with ironing is deterministic, it is not surprising that ironing does not allow us to dispose altogether of assumptions on the valuations and/or distributions, as is the case in Myerson's paper (recall the negative results in Dobzinski et al. [2011] and Papadimitriou and Pierrakos [2015] ). It is an open question as to whether ironing can help weaken these assumptions.
PRIOR INDEPENDENCE FOR NONPRIVATE VALUES
In this section, we begin to develop a theory of prior independence for interdependent values. Our main result is, for nonprivate values and the setting studied in Section 5.3, a prior-independent mechanism that achieves a constant-factor approximation of the optimal expected revenue. An interesting direction for future work is to design good prior-independent mechanisms for general interdependent values.
This section is organized as follows: after presenting the setting and stating the main result, we prove our result for a simple single-item setting in which bidders share a pure common value for the item. Section 6.5 generalizes the proof to matroid settings with nonprivate values.
Setting
We study a matroid setting with nonprivate values in which signals are independent and the Lopomo assumptions (Definition 5.9) hold.
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Symmetry. As is standard in the prior-independence literature (e.g., see Bulow and Klemperer [1996] , Goldberg et al. [2006] , Segal [2003] , and Dhangwatnotai et al. [2015] ), we focus on symmetric environments with n ≥ 2 bidders, as defined in Section 2.4 (in particular, symmetry need not hold for feasibility constraints).
Notation. As earlier, let F denote the joint distribution of the independent signals. Let G be the distribution from which each of the i.i.d. signals is drawn, and let g be the corresponding density (G is the marginal distribution of the signals given the joint product distribution F). We denote by G |s −i (·), g |s −i (·) the distribution and density of bidder i's value given the signal profile s −i of the other bidders.
Remark 6.1 (Strong MHR guarantee). Observe that, by independence, G |s −i (·) is simply the distribution of s i . It follows that the inverse hazard rate of bidder i's value, given signal profile s, is By the first and third Lopomo assumptions, the inverse hazard rate in Equation (9) is weakly decreasing in s i . We conclude that not only the signal distribution G is MHR, but also, for every bidder i, so is the value distribution G |s −i for every signal profile s −i .
The Single Sample Mechanism for Interdependent Values
We describe our prior-independent mechanism for interdependent values in Algorithm 2. It is a natural generalization of the single-sample mechanism of Dhangwatnotai et al. [2015] . Observe that the mechanism makes no reference to the distribution G.
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We are now ready to state this section's main result: that Algorithm 2, which is prior independent, is near optimal. We compare its expected revenue to OPT, the optimal expected revenue achieved by the generalization of Myerson's mechanism to interdependent values (Algorithm 1). In fact, due to the MHR setting, the proof will be able to relate the expected revenue to the expected welfare, establishing a stronger property of effectiveness, as defined by Neeman [2003] . The prior-independent single-sample mechanism in Algorithm 2 yields a constant factor approximation to OPT.
Useful Properties of MHR Distributions
We motivate our focus on MHR settings by the following example, which shows that, unlike independent private values for which regularity suffices, for interdependent values a stronger MHR assumption is necessary to guarantee near optimality of the single-sample mechanism. Note that, unlike previous sections, the MHR assumption is required only for the approximation guarantee (weaker assumptions are sufficient for incentive guarantees). More generally, the example demonstrates how interdependence can pose new technical challenges, arising from the information externalities among bidders. For this reason, the original analysis of Dhangwatnotai et al. [2015] no longer applies.
Example 6.3 (Non-MHR setting). Consider a digital goods setting with two bidders, whose i.i.d. signals are drawn from the equal revenue distribution F(s) = 1 − (1/s), truncated to a finite range [1, H] , where H is an arbitrarily large constant. The bidders have weighted-sum values with β = 1, that is, their pure common value is s 1 + s 2 (see Example 2.1). The optimal expected revenue in this setting is at least E[s 1 ] + E[s 2 ] ≈ 2 ln H, by charging each bidder the signal of the other. However, the expected revenue of the single-sample mechanism is E[min{s 1 , s 2 }], which is H.
The gap in Example 6.3 between the expectation of the distribution and the expectation of the lower among two random samples is due to the long tail of the non-MHR equal revenue distribution; we now show that for MHR distributions this issue does not arise. We also present several additional properties of MHR distributions that will be useful in the new analysis of the single-sample mechanism.
The next lemma is tight for the exponential distribution. 
PROOF. Let F with density f be the MHR distribution. Let h(·) be the hazard rate function of F and let H(·) be its cumulative hazard rate, that is,
Since F is MHR, h(·) is nonnegative and weakly increasing; therefore, H(·) is weakly increasing and convex. We can now write
where the first equality is by plugging in the distribution of the lower among two samples into E[x] = ∞ 0 1 − F(z)dz, the first inequality is by convexity of H, and the second inequality is via integration by substitution.
We now state a version of the previous lemma with an added threshold and a slightly increased constant. 
PROOF. Since s is drawn from an MHR distribution, we can write
Assume first that t ≤ E[s]/2; then,
where the second inequality is by Lemma 6.4 and the last one is by assumption. We now turn to the case in which t > E[s]/2, and complete the proof by observing that
The following simple lemmas are stated without proofs. In this section, we prove Theorem 6.2 for a simple setting with a single item for sale, which is valued the same by all bidders. We first state and prove our main lemma.
Main Lemma. Let s 1 , s 2 be i.i.d. signals drawn from an MHR distributionG. Consider a single bidder with value v(s 1 , s 2 ), where v is a symmetric valuation function increasing in its arguments. Fixing signal s 1 (resp., s 2 ), let the value distributionG |s 1 (resp.,G |s 2 ) be an MHR distribution. Let c = 1/8e (where e is the base of the natural logarithm). 14 LEMMA 6.9 (REUSING SAMPLE APPROXIMATES WELFARE).
In other words, plugging in the lower among s 1 , s 2 into the valuation function decreases the expected value by a factor of no more than c.
PROOF. Let m be the median of distributionG. We begin with the left-hand side of Equation (10) and condition on the event that s 2 ≥ m, which, given that s 2 ≤ s 1 , occurs with probability 1/4. Using that v is nondecreasing,
Now, we know that replacing a random MHR sample with the lower among two samples results in a loss of at most 1/2 (Lemma 6.4). This can be applied to the distributioñ G |s 1 =m of v(m, ·), which is MHR by assumption. We get that 
where the inequality follows by combining Lemma 6.8, by which the median upper bounds the optimal expected revenue, with Lemma 6.7, by which the optimal expected revenue and expected welfare are close. Taking expectation over s 2 completes the proof.
We are now ready to prove the special case of our main theorem: near optimality of the single-sample mechanism for the simple single-item, common-value setting.
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.2 FOR SINGLE ITEM WITH COMMON VALUE. Letṽ( s) be the pure common value of the item for the bidders, whose i.i.d. signals s 1 , . . . , s n are drawn from an MHR distribution G. In this simple setting, the single-sample mechanism in Algorithm 2 reduces to the following mechanism: choose a random reserve bidder; with probability 14 We do not optimize the constant c.
(n − 1)/n, the bidder with the highest signal is not chosen as reserve; the bidder then wins the item and is charged according to the second highest signal (whether or not the bidder with the second-highest signal is chosen as the reserve). 15 We claim that, in expectation, the revenue achieved by this VCG-like mechanism is a c(n − 1)/n-fraction of the expected welfare E s [ṽ(s 1 , . . . , s n ) ], where c is as indicated earlier.
The proof is by reduction to the single bidder setting of Lemma 6.9 (in which the single bidder will correspond to the highest bidder). From now on, we condition on the highest bidder not being chosen as reserve, incurring a loss of (n − 1)/n. Fix the n − 2 lowest signals, denoted without loss of generality s 3 ≥ · · · ≥ s n . Let v(·, ·) =ṽ(·, ·, s 3 , . . . , s n ) be the valuation function given the fixed signals. LetG be the distribution G conditioned on exceeding the threshold s 3 . By Lemma 6.6,G is MHR, and the two highest signals s 1 , s 2 can be seen as i.i.d. random draws fromG. One of these is the second-highest signal; thus, we can write the expected revenue of the single-sample mechanism as
In order to apply the main lemma (Lemma 6.9) to lower bound the expected revenue in Equation (11), recall thatṽ and hence v are symmetric and increasing. It is left to show thatG |s 1 andG |s 2 are MHR. Without loss of generality, considerG |s 2 . We know from Remark 6.1 that, given s 2 , . . . , s n , the distribution ofṽ |s −1 is MHR. If we condition this distribution onṽ |s −1 being at least as high asṽ |s −1 (s 3 ), we still get an MHR distribution by Lemma 6.6. The resulting distribution is precisely the distributionG |s 2 .
The proof can now be completed by applying Lemma 6.9 to get that the expected revenue in Equation (11) is at least cE s 1 ,s 2 ∼G [v(s 1 , s 2 )] for any fixed profile s 3 , . . . , s n , and finally by taking expectation over s 3 , . . . , s n according to the joint distribution of the n − 2 lowest among n draws from G.
Proof for General Setting
In this section, we prove Theorem 6.2 for a general matroid setting in which bidders have symmetric but distinct values. The proof relies on an extension of the main lemma (Lemma 6.9) presented earlier. Recall that the revenue originates both from the requirement to surpass the reserve signal and from having to surpass a threshold to be included in the potential winner set P. In the previous section, these could be summarized as a single requirement to surpass the second-highest signal. In the general setting, the analysis of the expected revenue needs to take both requirements into account, necessitating an extension of the main lemma. Another difference in the general setting is that we need to take into account the contribution to revenue from multiple bidders. For this, we use the second Lopomo assumption as well as the matroid assumption in order to relate the revenue contributors to the welfare contributors. This was unnecessary before due to the common-value assumption, and is also unnecessary in the digital-goods setting when all bidders but the reserve belong to the potential winner set P.
As before, let s 1 , s 2 be i.i.d. signals drawn from an MHR distributionG. Consider a single bidder with a symmetric and increasing valuation v(s 1 , s 2 ), and assume that the value distributionsG |s 1 andG |s 2 when one of the signals is fixed are MHR. Let c = 1/12e. 16 15 For this simple setting, the loss of a 1/n-fraction of the revenue due to the reserve bidder can be avoided. 16 As before, the constant is not optimized. LEMMA 6.10 (REUSING SAMPLE WITH THRESHOLD). For every threshold t ≥ 0,
PROOF. Let c = 1/12e, and let m be the median of distributionG from which s 1 , s 2 are independently drawn. Similar to the proof of Lemma 6.9, we have that
By Lemma 6.5, applied to the distributionG |s 2 =m of v(·, m), which is MHR by assumption, and using that v is weakly increasing, we get that
Similar to the proof of Lemma 6.9, we now fix
and taking expectation over s 1 conditional on s 1 ≥ t completes the proof.
The proof of Theorem 6.2 for the general setting is by reduction to the single bidder setting and application of Lemma 6.10. PROOF OF THEOREM 6.2 FOR GENERAL SETTING. Recall that we wish to analyze the expected revenue of the single-sample mechanism in Algorithm 2, for a matroid setting with n ≥ 2 bidders and symmetry, where the i.i.d. signals s 1 , . . . , s n are drawn from an MHR distribution G. Denote byṽ the symmetric valuation function of the bidders. Similar to the proof in Section 6.4, we will reduce this setting to a single-bidder setting to which Lemma 6.10 is applicable.
Without loss of generality, we name the chosen reserve bidder "bidder 2," and consider an arbitrary nonreserve bidder "bidder 1." We condition on the signals of all bidders other than 1 and 2 and omit them from the notation, that is, we use the notation v(s 1 , s 2 ) for bidder 1's value. In addition, we denote by t the threshold for bidder 1 to belong in the potential winner set P given the fixed signals. We can now write the expected contribution of bidder 1 to the expected revenue of the single-sample mechanism as
In what follows, we show that the expected contribution in Equation (12) is a constant fraction of the expected contribution of bidder 1 to the expected maximum welfare excluding bidder 2. To see how this completes the proof, take expectation over the fixed signals and sum up over nonreserve bidders. The total expected revenue of the singlesample mechanism is thus a constant fraction of the welfare excluding the reserve bidder, which is, in turn, an (n − 1)/n fraction of the total welfare.
We begin by writing down the expected contribution of bidder 1 to the expected maximum welfare excluding bidder 2. Crucially, the same threshold t as in the single-sample mechanism is the threshold for bidder 1 to be included in the welfare-maximizing set of bidders. This is because the potential winner set P of the single-sample mechanism is the feasible set of nonreserve bidders with the highest signals, and by single-crossing of values (second Lopomo assumption) and the matroid setting, this is also the welfaremaximizing feasible set. The expected welfare contribution is thus
It remains to compare Equation (12) to Equation (13). Since we know that v is symmetric and increasing, and that v(s 1 , ·), v(·, s 2 ) are distributed according to an MHR distribution (Remark 6.1), we can apply Lemma 6.10 to get that
OPEN QUESTIONS
Interdependent values are potentially a new frontier for algorithmic mechanism design; we conclude with a nonexhaustive list of directions for further research.
(1) Ex-post optimal and near-optimal mechanism design: (a) Optimality: For correlated values, in the absence of regularity and single crossing, finding the optimal mechanism may be a computationally hard problem. Are there weaker conditions (e.g., just single crossing but not regularity) under which a meaningful description of the optimal mechanism is available, perhaps via some form of Myerson-inspired ironing (see Myerson [1981] )? Is randomness necessary to achieve optimality (see irregular nonsingle-crossing example requiring randomness in Dobzinski et al. [2011] )? Similar questions apply to interdependent values, for which the goal would also be to weaken the Lopomo assumptions. Identifying tractable settings for the optimal mechanism problem may also have direct applicability to the efficient mechanism problem. (b) Approximation: For correlated values, Dobzinski et al. [2011] show a nearoptimal mechanism that does not rely on regularity or affiliation assumptions. Their mechanism is based on the appealing lookahead mechanism of Ronen [2001] . Is there a parallel result for interdependent values? (c) Simple, natural, and practical mechanisms (as advocated in Hartline and Roughgarden [2009] Li [2013] for one set of sufficient conditions. (2) Beyond ex-post mechanisms: There is a range of robustness levels to explore in mechanism design, and it is far from clear what is the "right" level. This may depend on information asymmetries in the market (e.g., is it reasonable/necessary to assume public knowledge of valuation functions), as well as on models of players' risk averseness and on practical considerations, such as the difficulty to collect payments from losing bidders (e.g., this motivates the "losers do not pay" condition considered by Lopomo [2000] ). What are the most economically meaningful robustness requirements, and what are optimal and approximately optimal mechanisms that achieve them? (3) Beyond optimal mechanism design: Interdependent values are an active research area in the design of other economic mechanisms and markets, to which computational insight potentially has much to contribute. See, for example, Satterthwaite et al. [2011] on double auctions, Che et al. [2015] on house allocation, or Csapó and Müller [2013] on public goods.
APPENDIX A. MISSING PROOFS RELATED TO MYERSON THEORY (SECTION 5)
In this appendix, we prove for completeness Propositions 5.1 and 5.2, using an adaptation of the techniques developed by Myerson [1981] ; for an exposition of these techniques, see Nisan [2007] , Theorem 9.39, and Hartline [2014] . We also prove for completeness Claim 5.6, which states a necessary condition for a matroid element to belong in a maximum-weight basis.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5.1. We fix i, s −i and omit them from the notation for simplicity.
First Direction. Assume that x is monotone and that the payment identity and inequality hold. We now set s = s + , divide throughout by , and take the limit. We get that PROOF OF CLAIM 5.6. Recall from Section 2.4.1 that finding the maximum-weight basis of a matroid in which tie-breaking is consistent with an ordering π can be implemented by a greedy algorithm G. This algorithm considers elements in nonincreasing order of weight while breaking ties according to π , and adds an element to the independent set it maintains as long as it does not revoke independence. The algorithm G terminates once the independent set becomes a basis. We may therefore assume without loss of generality that the algorithm for finding a maximum-weight basis is the algorithm G.
Consider now the element i. Our goal is to show that, if and only if there exists an independent set A such that one of the two conditions of Claim 5.6 holds for every j ∈ A but A ∪ {i} / ∈ I, then i is not chosen by G. We may assume without loss of generality that w i is minimum among all element weights and that i is last in the ordering π among all elements with weight w i . Otherwise, we can switch to a new matroid for which this holds by discarding all elements with weight < w i and all elements with weight w i that appear after i in the ordering π . The description of algorithm G makes it clear that element i is chosen by G with respect to the original matroid if and only if it is chosen by G with respect to the new matroid. Moreover, every set in the original matroid for which one of the two conditions of Claim 5.6 holds for every element also belongs to the new matroid.
To show the first direction of the claim, assume for contradiction that there exists such a set A and i is chosen by G. Denote by B * the maximum-weight basis found by the algorithm, where i belongs to B * by assumption. Let B be a basis containing the independent set A. Then, it must be the case that i / ∈ B. By the basis exchange property of matroids [Oxley 1992] , there is an element b ∈ B such that B * ∪ {b} \ {i} ∈ I. Since b either has weight < w i , or has weight w i and appears before i in π , we have reached a contradiction to the assumption that B * is a maximum-weight basis chosen by an algorithm that breaks ties according to π . To show the second direction of the claim, observe that G will not choose i only if there exists such a set A. This completes the proof of Claim 5.6.
